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ABSTRACT
The Tor anonymity network has been shown vulnerable to traffic
analysis attacks by autonomous systems and Internet exchanges,
which can observe different overlay hops belonging to the same cir-
cuit. We aim to determine whether network path prediction tech-
niques provide an accurate picture of the threat from such adver-
saries, and whether they can be used to avoid this threat. We per-
form a measurement study by running traceroutes from Tor relays
to destinations around the Internet. We use the data to evaluate the
accuracy of the autonomous systems and Internet exchanges that
are predicted to appear on the path using state-of-the-art path infer-
ence techniques; we also consider the impact that prediction errors
have on Tor security, and whether it is possible to produce a useful
overestimate that does not miss important threats. Finally, we eval-
uate the possibility of using these predictions to actively avoid AS
and IX adversaries and the challenges this creates for the design of
Tor.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Tor network for anonymous communication [10] is suscepti-
ble to end-to-end timing attacks [25], which allow an adversary
who observes traffic from a client to the first Tor router and at
the same time traffic from the last Tor router to the destination to
deanonymize the connection. Both of these paths traverse a number
of Internet routers that belong to various organizations, leaving the
possibility that a single network operator running an autonomous
system (AS) or an Internet exchange (IX) will be in the position
to observe both paths and thus carry out the end-to-end timing at-
tack [11,13,17,18,23]. This is made more likely by the concentra-
tion of Internet traffic at Tier 1 ISPs and high-volume IXes.
To assess the vulnerability of Tor to AS and IX adversaries, it is
necessary to predict the paths that traffic takes on the Internet. Pre-
vious work characterizing this threat has relied chiefly on AS-level
routing predictions [24]. Such predictions are well known to be
incomplete and imprecise, producing erroneous path predictions.
Our goal is to evaluate the impact of these errors on the anonymity
of Tor. In particular, we are concerned with two research questions:
• Are AS-level routing predictions suitable for characterizing
the threat of AS and IX adversaries in Tor?
• Can AS-level routing predictions be used to construct Tor
paths that avoid AS and IX adversaries (as has been sug-
gested in previous work [4, 11])?
To answer these questions, we performed a measurement study,
collecting traceroute probes from Tor relays to obtain a more ac-
curate picture of Internet paths actually used by network traffic.
In comparing results from traceroutes to state-of-the-art path pre-
diction, we found that the prediction accuracy was notably worse
than previously measured, despite the fact that we are interested
in a simplified prediction problem looking for the set of ASes (or
IXes) on a path, rather than the exact sequence. The errors include
both extraneous ASes and IXes in the prediction that are not seen
in traceroutes and, more worryingly, ASes and IXes in the tracer-
outes that are missing from the prediction. It is possible to produce
an overestimate of the AS and IX sets by considering several of the
most likely paths produced by the prediction algorithm, rather than
just the top one. Such overestimates reduce but do not eliminate
the problem of missing ASes and IXes, at the cost of significantly
increasing the number of extraneous predictions.
We next analyze the impact of these prediction errors on the vul-
nerability of Tor to AS- and IX-level adversaries, with the help of a
simulator that faithfully reconstructs Tor paths that may have been
chosen by a Tor user1. We find that AS and IX path prediction
significantly overestimates the threat of vulnerability to such ad-
versaries; at the same time, most users do run a significant risk
of compromise by an AS-level adversary as determined from the
traceroute data, whereas IX-level adversaries affect only a small
fraction of paths.
We then modify our simulator to specifically avoid selecting paths
that are vulnerable to AS or IX adversaries based on predictions,
as has been previously suggested. We show that this significantly
1TorPS: http://torps.github.io/
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limits the choice of paths and frequently results in no paths being
available for use while following the Tor practice of maintaining a
long-term fixed set of entry guards into the network. This suggests
a new consideration for the already complex set of tradeoffs in the
design of the mechanisms for selecting and updating the set of entry
guards used in Tor [12]; we note that the situation is made worse by
the recent move towards using a single entry guard instead of 3 [9].
On the other hand, we find that many of these failures are a conse-
quence of over-prediction, as we are often able to find suitable non-
vulnerable paths in our traceroute data set despite covering only a
fraction of the Tor relays. This suggests that a defense based on
proactive path measurement, rather than AS path models, is likely
to be more practical and offer better security guarantees.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Tor
Tor is a popular system for anonymous communication online. Tor
consists of a network of volunteer relays that form an overlay net-
work and forward traffic sent by users running Tor clients. As of
February 2015, it contains approximately 7 000 relays and trans-
fers around 70 Gbps of data for user population estimated at over
2 000 000.2
Tor uses onion routing [10] to achieve anonymity. A client sets up
a connection to a destination by choosing a sequence of three re-
lays, conventionally called guard, middle, and exit, and establish-
ing a circuit through the sequence. The client encrypts a message
once for each circuit relay (a process called onion encryption) then
sends it through the circuit, and each relay removes one layer of
encryption before forwarding. The final relay sends unencrypted
messages to the destination. The reverse process happens for mes-
sages from the destination to the client. As a result of this process,
the client identity is only directly observable in traffic between the
client and the guard relay, and the destination identity is only di-
rectly observable in traffic between the exit relay and the destina-
tion.
In order to be real-time and efficient, Tor does not mix, pad or delay
traffic. Therefore it is vulnerable to attacks based on traffic analy-
sis. For example, an adversary that can observe a circuit between
the client and guard and also between the exit and destination can
correlate the traffic patterns and deanonymize the connection [7].
Thus entities that can observe parts the underlying network infras-
tructure, such as Internet Service Providers or Internet Exchanges,
are a serious threat to Tor. Previous work has shown that individ-
ual Autonomous Systems and Internet Exchanges are in fact fre-
quently in a position to break Tor’s security [11, 13, 17, 18, 23].
However, almost all of this analysis uses heuristic route-inference
techniques whose accuracy may not be satisfactory. Murdoch and
Zielin´ski [23] do study Tor security against IXes using traceroutes
from Tor relays, but that analysis is from the UK only and does not
consider whether IX adversaries can be avoided during path selec-
tion.
2.2 Internet routing
Internet routing at the highest level is performed among autonomous
systems using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). An AS is a net-
work with an opaque internal routing policy (e.g., using OSPF, IS-
IS, RIP, or iBGP) that routes traffic to and from other networks.
2https://metrics.torproject.org/
BGP is a path-vector routing protocol, that is, neighboring net-
works advertise the whole AS path that they will use to send traffic
to a given destination. A path is advertised for an IP prefix and rep-
resents the path used for all IP addresses sharing that prefix. Path-
vector routing enables each AS to make complex routing decisions
based on factors such as individual contracts with other ASes.
Understanding the behavior of such complex routing policies on
the Internet is a challenging problem. Routers just propagate the
routes that they provide for a given neighbor to use, and so differ-
ent Internet vantage points reveal different subsets of global routing
behavior. Sources of routing data include the Route Views Project3,
which provides BGP routing information from many large ASes,
and CAIDA Archipelago4, which provides and analyzes traceroute
data from three teams of 17–18 monitors distributed worldwide.
Gao describes how to use such data to infer Internet routes [14].
Gao’s method uses heuristics to classify the observed connections
between ASes by their economic relationship (viz. customer-to-
provider, provider-to-customer, peer-to-peer, or sibling), and then
shortest-path valley-free routing is used to infer the route between
two hosts. Qiu and Gao improve the accuracy of this technique by
incorporating the observed advertised BGP paths [24]. In addition,
they describe how to infer a set of possible paths rather than just
one. Their results show that these techniques can infer the exact
correct AS path for 60% of evaluation ASes; furthermore, the ex-
act path is found within the top 5 predicted possible paths for 83%
ASes and within the top 14 paths for 86% ASes.
Many links between ASes occur at Internet Exchanges. These are
facilities that provide space and infrastructure for ASes to locate
routers and establish connections. Ager et al. [3] describe how the
largest IXes may provide links among hundreds of ASes and carry
petabytes of traffic per day. Augustin et al. [6] describe how IXes
on Internet routes can be detected using traceroutes and an index of
known IXes and their IP prefixes. They identify 44 000 peering re-
lationships between ASes at IXes. Each peering between two ASes
indicates that some traceroute passed directly from one AS to an-
other through an IX. Discovering such links can improve the accu-
racy of AS path inference techniques. However, as we will observe,
it doesn’t discern among different router-level paths taken between
the same two ASes, which may pass through different IXes.
The traceroute tool is extraordinarily useful in measuring routing
behavior on the Internet. There are many variations of the basic
algorithm [21] which provide different levels of success depending
on the traffic engineering (e.g. filtering and load balancing) that
occurs en route. In addition to such problems with traceroute itself,
it is not always straightforward to make inferences about Internet
paths from a traceroute. For example, Mao et al. [22] describe the
difficulties of inferring an AS-level path from traceroutes, which
include that different iterations of a single traceroute might take
different paths, that reported IP addresses may be from a network
interface other than the one that actually received it, and that map-
ping from IP address to AS number is non-trivial due to inaccu-
rate WHOIS information. Augustin et al. [6] discuss similar issues
in inferring the presence of IXes from traceroutes. Nevertheless,
traceroutes do provide a generally accurate picture of how packets
are actually routed and serve as an important comparison point to
AS-level path predictions.
3http://www.routeviews.org/
4http://www.caida.org/projects/ark/
3. MAPPING NETWORK ADVERSARIES
3.1 Measuring Internet Paths
3.1.1 Generating Traceroutes
Our measurement study consists of running traceroutes from Tor
relays to various destinations in the Internet. We use the scamper5
network tool, which probes multiple destinations in parallel, and
uses techniques to accurately discover the Internet path traversed
by packets in the presence of multi-path load balancing [5, 19].
For our measurements, we extracted the set advertised destination
IP prefixes from the September 2013 RIB dumps from Route Views.
Each relay running the measurements picks a random IP address
within each of the ∼500K prefixes and performs a traceroute to
that destination. We also collected traceroutes to Tor relay destina-
tions as well as a scan of all /24 IPv4 subnets, but this data was not
used for the analysis in this paper. We focus on advertised prefixes
to make analysis more tractable. We expect addresses within a pre-
fix to use the same or similar routes, and our analysis of CAIDA’s
traceroutes to all /24 IPv4 subnets [2] found that 81% of the time
traceroutes destined to the same routable prefix traversed the same
set of ASes. Our measurement scripts are available for public re-
view.6
3.1.2 Processing Traceroutes
We next process the traceroutes to determine which ASes and ISPs
an Internet path has traversed. First, we filter out traceroutes that
do not successfully reach the destination. Note that because we use
randomized destinations, in many cases the destination may not
exist or may be down; indeed, only a small fraction (8%) of probes
reaches their target. However, 49% reach the AS of the destination,
as determined by the MaxMind GeoIP database [1].
We further find that 94% of the traceroutes are missing some hops
from the path. In some cases, we believe this is caused by routers
close to the probe source rate limiting their ICMP responses. To
address this, we perform route stitching, where gaps in a tracer-
outes are filled by path segments observed in other traceroutes. For
example, if we see a path “A B C D E” and another path “A B *
D F,” where “*” denotes a missing hop, we can repair the second
path by inferring that the third hop must have also been C in this
case. To minimize inaccuracies introduced by this repair mecha-
nism, we only consider path segments that originate from the same
host, and which are contained within the same batch of 64K tracer-
outes, which typically occur within an hour or two of each other.
We validated this approach on complete paths and found that stitch-
ing would have given us the correct AS path result 96% of the time.
We then compute the ASes corresponding to each IP in the path
using the GeoIP database. Similar to Mao et al. [22], we consider
the corresponding AS path complete if the traceroute reached the
AS of the destination and there are no missing hops in the path on
the boundary between ASes. For example, an AS path “AS1 AS1
* AS1 AS2 AS3” is considered complete, because the missing hop
is contained entirely within AS1, whereas “AS1 AS1 * AS2 AS3”
is considered incomplete. Overall, 28% of the traceroutes yield
a complete AS path. We discard the other traceroutes from our
analysis. We also identify an IX as on the path if the path contains
an IP address from the list of known IP addresses of IX points as
outlined in the following section.
5http://www.caida.org/tools/measurement/scamper/
6URL removed for blinded review
Min Max Total
Traces 392 334 1 195 577 17 233 153
IP Reached 27 254 81 999 1 183 427
AS Reached 204 836 618 224 8 890 142
Repaired 26 375 876 386 9 643 679
Whole IP Path 0 16 694 253 058
Whole AS Path 11 285 397 533 5 350 713
Probed Hops 7 005 020 20 624 809 297 301 238
Responsive Hops 1 594 449 7 041 819 109 046 956
% Hops Responded 19 55 37
Inferred Paths 10 693 220 449 4 367 097
Table 1: Traceroute experiment statistics (28 hosts)
3.2 Inferring Path ASes and IXes
We are interested in comparing the AS and IX adversaries identi-
fied from traceroute data compared to AS and IX adversaries in-
ferred from AS maps which are much easier to attain and main-
tain. We predict AS paths from source to destination using Gao’s
algorithm [14] to classify relationships and Qiu and Gao’s algo-
rithm [24] to infer the top k paths (for k = 1 to 5). While advances
have been made in classifying AS link relationships [20], we find
that matching route information broadcasts is more accurate than
using graph based methods based solely on AS relationships [18].
It is known that AS relationships are difficult to classify especially
at the highly interconnected core of the AS graph. Violations in
the valley-free principle from advertised routes often indicate er-
roneous AS relationship classification especially through top tier
ASes. Therefore Qiu and Gao’s method of prepending advertised
routes to complete paths yields accurate results even with incor-
rectly classified AS relationships at the core of the Internet. Since
the prepended hops are almost entirely easily classified customer-
to-provider hops at the bottom of the AS graph, improving the AS
relationship classification of the top-level ASes does little to im-
prove overall AS path prediction accuracy.
To predict the presence of IXes, we recreate the work of Augustin
et al. [6]. We scraped Packet Clearing House7 and the Peering
Database8 in February of 2014 creating a list of 732 Internet ex-
change points and their known prefixes. We parsed over 200 mil-
lion traceroutes from February and March 2014 collected from both
the CAIDA routed IPv4 database [2] and the iPlane project9 to map
roughly 130 000 Internet exchange point peerings for our subse-
quent test data. This number is roughly twice the number of links
found by Augustin et al. in 2009, which is unsurprising considering
the trend for ASes to peer at IX points. This list of source AS, des-
tination AS, and IX number is used to identify potential IX points
on AS-level paths throughout our experiment. The list of IXes and
prefixes is used to positively identify IX points in the IP traces.
4. MEASUREMENTVERSUS INFERENCE
We first investigate how closely ASes and IXes identified through
inference correspond to ASes and IXes measured with traceroute.
We conduct analysis on 17 million traceroute measurements ob-
tained from 28 Tor relay servers from January 19th to January 26th
2014 as summarized in Table 110. Our 28 servers included many of
7http://www.pch.net
8https://www.peeringdb.com
9http://iplane.cs.washington.edu/
10We extend sincere thanks to the volunteer Tor relay operators who
assisted us with this study.
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Figure 5: Observed Internet Exchange Points
the largest Tor relays and cover a portion of the Tor network which
includes 23% of guard node capacity and 26% of exit node capac-
ity. Thus, their measurements can give us good insight into how
traffic is routed in and out of Tor. Of these 17 million traces, only
about 1 million reached the target IP address with roughly 250 000
complete paths with no missing IP hops. We find that roughly 9
million paths can have some hops filled in by using the repair tech-
niques presented in section 3. We map each IP address to AS num-
bers using the MaxMind GeoLite ASN database taken from Jan-
uary 15th 2014 [1]. The AS-level paths are then parsed to remove
routing loops, duplicate hops, and missing hops directly preceded
by and followed by the same AS. After processing, we obtain 5.3
million complete AS-level routes.
4.1 Identifying AS Adversaries
We first investigate the accuracy of inferring ASes between an ar-
bitrary source/destination AS compared to the ASes identified in
our collected traceroutes. The analysis of path prediction accuracy
is conducted on traceroutes collected during January 19–26, 2014
giving 5.3 million traces contain 450 000 unique AS source and
destination pairs. We divide the traceroute data into 24-hour win-
dows. Routing table dumps are downloaded from each server from
the Route Views project from the time closest to the 12th hour of
the window. Each day window contains an average of 15 prefix
table dumps with between four to six gigabytes of route informa-
tion broadcasts. Using Qiu and Gao’s model we predict the top
k=5 paths for roughly 400 000 of these pairs with the rest failing
due to either the source or destination AS missing from the Route-
Views routing tables. The 400 000 successful path inferences cover
4.5 million of our 5.3 million traces with AS paths. We consider
the inference identifying the correct path if it matches the AS path
seen in the traceroute for any of the top k paths considered.
Figure 3 is a CDF showing the number of ASes seen in the tracer-
oute but missed by the top k predicted paths. Zero missing ASes
correspond with a correct path prediction for at least one of the k
paths. Using only the top path from the prediction, yields roughly
20% prediction accuracy with a decreasing return for higher lev-
els of k and a maximum accuracy of 48% when considering the
top 5 paths. This accuracy is far lower than the 83% accuracy for
the top 5 paths attained by Qiu and Gao; however, their valida-
tion was conducted using Route Views data as the ground truth and
not traceroute data [14]. We surmise the lower accuracy is due to
a combination of known error sources both from the increase in
prevalence of IX peering [3] and inherent errors in traceroute mea-
surements from actual AS-level paths [27]. We finally note that the
overall accuracy of prediction is similar to our extensive analysis
of accuracy against CAIDA traceroutes demonstrating that the Tor
network would benefit from improvements to path prediction in the
general case [18].
4.2 Identifying IX Adversaries
Given an AS path, we can identify the set of potential IXes that
could occur on this path by considering which IXes can be used for
each AS–AS hop, as discussed in Section 3.2. Figure 4 compares
the set of potential IXes for the top k predicted AS paths to the
set to the IXes identified by IP address prefix in traceroutes. Once
again, a value of zero indicates that all IXes have been identified in
the inference. We find that the top path identifies roughly 40% of
the IXes and the top five paths identify roughly 74% of the IXes.
We expect traceroutes to provide a much more accurate picture of
which IXes were involved on a path than AS path predictions. A
pair of ASes will often have multiple peering points, depending
on the geographic location the source and destination; as a result,
only a fraction of traffic between the two ASes will use a given
IX. In Figure 5, we compare the set of IXes on a traceroute to the
predicted set of IXes that could be used at each AS–AS hop in the
traceroute. We see that while most traceroutes do not traverse any
IX, the AS–AS hops result in 3–8 potential IXes on average. This
demonstrates the limitations of using only AS-level information to
infer IXes on a path.
4.3 Choosing k Top Paths
Choosing the k top paths to consider when predicting AS and IX
points presents an important tradeoff between missing ASes/IXes
versus severely overstating the number of ASes/IXes on a given
path. Figures 1 and 2 show the missing AS/IXes and extra AS/IXes
seen by the path prediction algorithms for the k top paths from k =
1 to 5. For ASes, we see diminishing returns for missing ASes for
larger values of k with false positives increasing quickly for larger
values of k. Overall, the average attainable missing AS accuracy is
close to 1 for the top path decreasing down to .6 for the top 5 paths.
We compare the IXes found using vulnerable AS–AS hops from
the inferred AS paths directly to the IXes identified by prefix in
the traceroutes. In general, very few IX points were seen in the
traceroutes. In most hosts, IX identification is helped very little
by increasing the top paths with the average missing IX of about
.2 per hop. This is unsurprising because if there are no IX points
in the traceroutes, then there can be no missing IXes in the infer-
ence. Unfortunately, the false positives for IX points are problem-
atic with linearly increasing averages ranging from 10-25 for each
of our hosts illustrating the need for better methods in identifying
IX points.
For AS adversaries, a k value of 1 or 2 seems most appropriate to
identify most AS adversaries without causing too many false pos-
itives. Higher values of k give lower rates of return while causing
a linear increase in false positives. Identifying IX adversaries is
much more problematic. Since the traceroutes identify very few IX
adversaries to begin with, a k value of 1 appears to work well. The
inaccuracy of the method can be seen in the false positives which
also increase linearly with k but greatly over-predict the number
of adversaries even with a k value of 1. The inaccuracy of AS
and highly inaccurate IX prediction could potentially cause serious
problems when designing a system of AS/IX independence in Tor.
We analyze the effects of this inaccuracy in the following sections.
5. AS AND IX ADVERSARIES IN TOR
Errors in path prediction call into question previous work that has
used path prediction to both evaluate the security of Tor and pro-
pose changes to Tor’s path selection based on path predictions. Un-
derstanding the effect of the errors uncovered by our traceroute
measurements requires taking into account the specific properties
of Tor.
We accomplish such an analysis by simulating the Tor protocol and
network at a high level. We use and adapt the Tor Path Simulator
(TorPS)11 to perform Monte Carlo simulation of Tor path selection
by a single client. By using the hourly network “consensuses” and
server “descriptors” archived by CollecTor12, we can recreate the
state of the Tor network over the period we run our simulations, in-
cluding features such as the number, bandwidths, and addresses of
Tor relays available in any given hour. We simulate “typical” user
11https://github.com/torps
12https://collector.torproject.org/
activity using the recorded volunteer trace of Johnson et al. [17],
which includes user behaviors such as web search and webmail on
a plausible daily schedule. Over the course of a week, this sched-
ule results in 2632 streams (i.e., TCP connections over Tor), each
to one of 205 distinct IP addresses occupying 168 unique ASes, on
either port 80 or 443. Finally, we run simulations using the most
common client ASes as measured by Juen in Fall 2011 [18].
Simulating path selection in Tor allows us to estimate which Inter-
net hosts a user’s traffic is likely to flow over in a typical use case.
Then we can use our traceroute data to determine the specific Inter-
net routes that traffic would take and evaluate the resulting security.
Specifically, we provide new estimates for how often a Tor stream
flows through the same AS or IX between the client and the guard
and between the destination and the exit. When this happens, the
AS or IX is in a position to deanonymize the client. This issue was
previously studied only using inferred AS paths and IX sets.
In addition, using this method we provide an improved evalua-
tion of the repeatedly-proposed [11, 13] modification to Tor to use
AS/IX path inference to choose relays that are path independent,
that is, that result in paths for which the same AS or IX cannot
observe both the client and the destination. We modify TorPS to
produce the first simulator for path-independent Tor (to our knowl-
edge) that reproduces how path selection occurs over time, includ-
ing features that have the potential to significantly alter the effec-
tiveness of the path-independence requirement, such as guard lists
and circuit reuse. We apply our traceroute measurements to the
results of these simulations to evaluate the effectiveness of path in-
ference as a basis for path independence in Tor.
5.1 Vanilla Tor
All of our Tor simulations run over the week of January 19–25,
2014. When producing and analyzing these simulations, we gen-
erally use the same data sources and inference algorithms as in
Sec. 3.2 to produce AS path inferences, AS-level IX inferences,
and traceroute IX inferences. We use daily AS-path inferences con-
ducted from January 19th-25th 2014 compared to the traces from
each day of the simulation week. We also use the daily Route Views
prefix-to-AS datasets to determine routed prefixes and to map IPs
to ASes. When analyzing our simulations using traceroutes, we
use all of the traceroute measurements gathered during the week
of January 19th-25th 2014. In our analysis we match a traceroute
to a pair of communicating hosts in Tor if the source prefix and
destination prefix match.
We first conduct a simulation using the default Tor path selection
algorithm. We consider clients coming from 50 of the top 200 most
common client ASes (as measured by Juen [18]). Each AS adver-
tises hundreds of possible prefixes in the Route Views data. We
select at random twenty prefixes per client AS for a total of 1 000
client prefixes for the simulations. The simulator runs 10 000 rep-
etitions of simulated traffic using input data from the week of Jan-
uary 19th–25th 2014 yielding over 24 million traffic streams per
client prefix with 18.2 million unique streams. We identify the
presence of AS and IX adversaries using AS-path inference with
the top k paths (k=1 to 5) and our collected traceroute data from
January 19th–January 25th. In total, we have inferred path infor-
mation for an average of 18 million streams per client prefix (18
billion total) and traceroute information for an average of 112 000
streams per client prefix (14 million total).
5.1.1 Inferred Adversaries
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Figure 6: Directional AS Compromises for K Top Paths
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Figure 7: Directional IX Compromises for K Top Paths
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Figure 8: AS Compromises Measured and Inferred
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Figure 9: IX Compromises Measured and Inferred
We first look at the percentage of simulated Tor paths which have
the same AS or IX on both the client-to-guard path and the exit-
to-destination path using only the inferred paths. We look at the
percentage of compromised paths considering the set of ASes and
IXes in the forward direction (client to destination), the reverse di-
rection, the forward and reverse directions combined. We also con-
sider the direction of streams leaving Tor; i.e., from the guard to
the client and from the exit to the destination. This matches the
direction of our traceroute measurements from Tor relays to exter-
nal IP prefixes and allows us to compare the predicted paths with
traceroute data, without errors being introduced due to asymmetric
Internet paths that traverse a different set of ASes and IXes. We
call this the Tor path.
Figures 6 and 7 show the percentage of inferred ASes and IXes for
each direction and top k paths averaged over all 18 billion inferred
streams. Considering only the top path, we see 11.6%, 11.6%,
12.1% and 21.6% AS compromise rates for the forward, reverse,
Tor, and forward/reverse paths respectively. We see a significant
increase in AS adversaries when considering more paths topping at
58.8%, 60.6%, 62.0%, and 71.8% when considering the top 5 paths
for the forward, reverse, Tor and forward/reverse paths respectively.
We notice little difference between the compromise rates of the
Tor paths versus the forward or reverse. As expected, the forward
and reverse combined represents a higher inferred compromise rate
since we consider two sets of ASes per path. The forward/reverse
has roughly a 10% greater rate of compromise for the top path and
roughly a 20% greater compromise rate when k is varied from 2
to 5. For the top path, the IX compromise rates were higher with
27.0%, 17.5%, 29.3% and 43.5% for the forward, reverse, Tor and
forward/reverse paths respectively. These increased rapidly at first
leveling off to 72.3%, 72.5%, 74.7% and 77.2% for the top 5 paths.
Once again, the forward/reverse paths contain more potential IX
adversaries due to considering more paths. There is little signifi-
cant difference between the compromise rates of the forward paths
and the Tor paths. We also note that the number of inferred poten-
tial adversaries greatly increases when considering a higher number
of top k paths.
5.1.2 Measured and Inferred Adversaries
We now compare the inferred AS and IX adversaries to the AS and
IX adversaries actually present in the traceroute measurements for
all of our simulated Tor circuits. To make the comparison fair, we
only consider the traceroutes and inferred paths going from the Tor
guard to the client and from the Tor exit to the destination. As
seen in the last section, the inferred paths using this Tor direction
contain similar compromise rates to the paths in the forward and
reverse directions. We thus consider the subset of paths for which
we have both AS inferences and measured traceroutes in the Tor
direction giving us a set of 141 million streams from 1000 unique
client prefixes.
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Figure 10: AS Compromise Agreement
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Figure 11: AS Compromise False Positives
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Figure 12: AS Compromise False Negatives
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Figure 13: IX Compromise Agreement
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Figure 14: IX Compromise False Positives
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Figure 15: IX Compromise False Negatives
AS/IX Compromise CDFs Per Prefixes with both TraceRoute and Inferred Data
Figure 8 shows the CDF of streams compromised in the traceroute
measurements compared to the inferred for various k top paths. In-
terestingly, the AS compromise rates for the top path is similar to
the actual compromise rates seen in the measurements. Consider-
ing the top 2 paths more than doubles the inferred compromise rate
with lower increases with increasing k topping out at a little under
a 50% compromise rate for half the paths. Figure 9 shows the CDF
of streams compromised with measured versus inferred IX adver-
saries. The actual percentage of paths with an IX adversary iden-
tified by prefix is much smaller than the inferred value with only
.8% of streams seeing an IX adversary on both the client to guard
and exit to destination simultaneously. The inferred paths greatly
over exaggerate the threat with the top path giving an average of
40% compromise rate and the top 5 five paths giving an average of
nearly 60% compromise rate. Thus, the method of inferring IX ad-
versaries greatly over predicts the number of actual IXes seen when
measuring paths using traceroute.
We now consider the differences between adversaries seen using
the inference methods versus the adversaries seen in the tracer-
outes. We consider adversaries seen in the inferred set but not
in the measured set as false positives and adversaries seen in the
measurements but not the inferred set false negatives. While the
traceroute measurement can contain errors and does not constitute
perfect ground truth, we consider it more reliable than the inferred
methods. In the following analysis all percentages are the percent-
age of paths compared to the set of all 141 million paths for which
we have both inferred and measured data.
Figures 10 thru 15 show the CDFs for the percentage of streams
compromised per prefix for both ASes and IXes that both methods
agree, the inference indicates an adversary while the measurement
does not (false positives) and the measurement indicates an adver-
sary while the inference does not (false negative). We see that while
the percentage of overall AS compromises for the top path was sim-
ilar in the last section, they do not agree on which AS is causing
the compromise. In our measurements, we find roughly 10.9 % of
streams could contain a potential AS adversary. Unfortunately, the
measured and inferred AS only agree for an average of 2.6% AS
compromises when considering the top path. Increasing to the top
two paths improves this by a factor of 2 to 5.1% average agreement
with higher k values giving diminishing returns after that. Unfortu-
nately, increasing k from 1 to 2 significantly increases the average
number of false positives from 8.5% to 22.6% with a more linear
increase with k up to 41.1% with k = 5. For false negatives, the
greatest drop once again occurs when going from the top paths to
the top two paths from 8.4% to 5.8% with diminishing returns with
increasing k and a minimum of 4.3% average with k = 5. Overall,
the AS inference with the top 2 paths catch a little less than half
the measured AS adversaries catching 5.1% and missing 5.8% of
the actually measured 10.9% of measured AS adversaries Unfortu-
nately, it still pre-emptively would eliminate 22.6% of paths which
had no measured adversary.
The agreement with the IX adversaries is even lower. Both methods
agree on only .36% of paths having an IX adversary considering
the top path increasing to .44% for the top two paths up to .47% for
the top 5 paths. The false positive rate is unacceptably high with
34.5% for the top path and 48.1% for the top 2 paths up to 55.7%
for the top 5 paths. The false negative rate is .54% for the top path
lowering to .45% for the top two paths down to .42% for the top
five paths. Thus eliminating paths based on the inference with the
top path would catch 40.0% of the observed IX adversaries (.9% of
total paths) while eliminating 34.5% of paths unnecessarily. Using
the top 2 paths would catch 48.9% of observed IX adversaries while
eliminating 48.1% of paths unnecessarily. Thus, roughly half of all
potential paths would be eliminated to catch the .9% of total paths
with an observed IX adversary. This motivates the need for better
methods of inferring IX adversaries in order to effectively mitigate
the threat to the Tor system.
Top 1
Path
Top 3
Paths
Mean fraction of streams
that have traceroutes 0.0037 0.0026
Mean fraction of streams
with traceroutes that
are w/o independence
0.0043 0.0014
Min prob of at least one
stream w/o independence 0.018 0
Mean prob of at least one
stream w/o independence 0.11 0.053
Max prob of at least one
stream w/o independence 0.22 0.18
(a) Undetected compromise among streams that success-
fully connected
Top 1
Path
Top 3
Paths
Mean fraction of all
streams that fail due to
independence constraint
0.051 0.060
Mean fraction of streams
that have traceroutes 0.19 0.19
Mean fraction of streams
w/ traceroutes that have
an independent path
0.96 0.95
Min prob of at least
one stream failure 1 1
(b) Unnecessary failure among streams without any in-
dependent path
Table 2: Path-independent Tor traceroute analysis over 189 top client ASes
5.2 Path-independent Tor
In order to avoid deanonymization by an AS or IX, Tor clients could
attempt to choose Tor relays such that the forward and reverse paths
between the client and guard are independent of the forward and re-
verse paths between the exit and destination, in terms of the ASes
and IXes that appear. However, it is non-trivial to design a sys-
tem that allows the client to do so, because he must preserve his
anonymity while making this decision, and Tor should be usable
even by users with little bandwidth and low-powered devices.
As we discuss in Section 6, Edman and Syverson [11] presented
the first detailed proposal for solving this problem with a system
that provides enough data for clients to build an AS Internet map
on which to run AS-path inference. They propose a slightly less
accurate algorithm than Qiu and Gao’s for efficiency. Juen added
IX inference to this idea [18]. None of this previous work explains
how AS/IX-independent circuits should be created over time, and
thus does not consider how path independence interacts with Tor
guards or circuit reuse. Tor guards in particular are a key Tor fea-
ture that defends against malicious observation and deanonymiza-
tion [12,17]. Thus the prior work does not give a clear idea of how
well AS/IX-independent path selection would work even if path-
inference techniques were very accurate.
The inaccuracy of path-inference techniques is likely to negatively
impact AS/IX-independent path selection in at least two ways: (i)
missing an AS or IX on a path could cause the user to create a path
vulnerable to deanonymization, and (ii) incorrectly believing that
an AS or IX exists on a path could leave the user with few or no
ways to connect to the destination. These problems are placed in
tension by the inference methodology because false negatives make
(i) worse and false positives make (ii) worse. For example, as the
number k of top paths used in inference increases, false negatives
should go down but false positives should go up. Moreover, the
inference needs to have few false negatives on all paths collectively,
or a user will face an increasing risk of deanonymization as he visits
new destinations and is forced by network churn to use different
relays. Similarly, an increasing number of false positives over time
could force the user to choose between not connecting to certain
destinations and exposing himself to more and more potentially-
malicious guards.
We investigate the suitability of path inference as a basis for AS/IX-
independent path selection using path simulation and our traceroute
data, similar to how they were used in Section 5.1 to explore vanilla
Tor security. As a byproduct of this research, we also expose a
security-performance tradeoff inherent in the path-independent ap-
proach and reveal some opportunities to fill in and improve past
proposals.
5.2.1 Methodology
In order to evaluate AS/IX-independent path selection via simula-
tion, we must fill in the details of the algorithm sketched out by
prior work. We adapt the existing Tor path-selection algorithm for
this purpose. We require clients to have at least 3 guards in their
guard list and to have at least 2 guards active with AS/IX path infor-
mation with the client when creating a new circuit. Upon receiving
a stream request, existing circuits are examined for suitability, in-
cluding path independence. If none is suitable, then circuit-creation
is initiated by choosing an existing guard, then an exit, and then
a middle. If a path-independent exit cannot be found for a given
guard, the other guards are considered, and so on. If no exit is
found for any current guard, then the circuit creation fails. We note
that to enable a direct comparison with our traceroute data, our sim-
ulator only compares the inferred AS/IX path from the guard to the
client and from the exit to the destination when determining path
independence (i.e. only reverse entry and forward exit paths are
used).
We generally follow the same experimental methodology as that
followed in Section 5.1. We will not be estimating full distribu-
tions, and thus we use only 500 samples per client AS, but we run
experiments with the 189 of the top 200 client ASes that were in
our AS-level routing map.
In our experimental analysis, we are able to use traceroute data to
identify false negatives and false positives. 50 client IPs are chosen
randomly from the set of the initial IPs in each prefix advertised
by the client’s AS (according to the RouteViews prefix-to-AS file
that appears most recently before that stream occurred). To identify
false negatives, we test streams that were successfully assigned to
a circuit by looking for a traceroute from the guard’s routing prefix
to the client’s and from the exit’s prefix to the destination’s. When
both traceroutes are found, we look for ASes or IXes that appear in
common. To identify false positives, we test streams that failed to
connect by looking for a traceroute from any of the active guards
at that time to the client and from any potential exit to the destina-
tion. If such a pair exists, we look for the lack of any AS or IX in
common.
5.2.2 Results
Table 2a provides estimates for the effects of path inference er-
rors on the security of path-independent Tor. The min, mean, and
max values are taken over 188 top client ASes (we further excluded
one that didn’t advertise any prefixes during the simulation week).
Our traceroute data provided path information (i.e. matched both
guard-client and exit-destination host-prefix pairs in the direction
out from Tor) for 0.26–0.38% of the simulations’ streams (depend-
ing on whether the top 1 or the top 3 inferred paths were used to de-
termine independence). Of these, between 0.14% and 0.43% were
revealed tofigures/ violate path independence. While this may seem
acceptably low, even one Tor deanonymization is potentially seri-
ous, and over the course of the simulated week, a client had on
average between a 5.3% and a 11% probability of experiencing at
least one path-independence violation. In the most unlucky client
ASes, path independence was violated with a probability as high as
18–21%!
Table 2b shows that this insecurity cannot simply be handled by
increasing the number of top possible paths from which the in-
ferred ASes and IXes are taken. It reveals that by increasing the
number of top paths used in inference from 1 to 3, the fraction of
streams for which no path-independent Tor circuit could be created
increased from 5.1% to 6%. For these streams, no AS/IX path-
independent exit could be found using any of the client’s guards.
Note that a stream failure of any kind never occurred in simulation
with Tor’s default path selection, because Tor doesn’t require path
independence, and many exits are available for each stream in the
user trace. Such failures are particularly bad because the stream
will not succeed until the Tor relay population changes sufficiently,
a process which could take days or weeks. Thus even a 5.1–6%
failure rate has a severely deleterious effect on Tor’s suitability for
general Internet use. Moreover, we can see that every simulated
client experienced at least one stream failure (i.e. the estimated
failure probability is 1.0 for all client ASes).
However, our traceroute measurements offer the hopeful news for
this problem that most of these stream failures may have been un-
necessary. We were able to match a traceroute guard-to-client and
exit-to-destination for 19% of failed streams. Our coverage of failed
streams is so much higher than for connected streams because we
look for a traceroute from any active guard of the client at the time
and from any exit that could be chosen with that guard and for
that destination (ignoring only the path-independence constraint).
Among streams for which we were able to match at least one pair
of traceroutes, 95–96% had a guard and exit that the traceroutes
show would have been AS/IX-independent. In fact, this high false-
positive rate is not just a result of having many exit paths about
which to be be incorrect — an average of about 80% of all guard
and exit pairs with matched outgoing traceroutes were observed to
be path-independent for both experiments.
5.2.3 Discussion
Our evaluation of AS/IX-independent path selection is not intended
to make any definitive claims about its usefulness. Instead, we at-
tempt to make reasonable choices about the algorithm details in
order to get some idea of how well it might work overall and espe-
cially in conjunction with path-inference techniques. Indeed, there
are many plausible improvements to the algorithm we have evalu-
Method Forward Reverse Both
Feamster and Dingledine 17.7% 16.1% NA
Edmond and Syverson 10.9% 11.1% 17.8%
Wacek et al. NA NA 27.39 %
Juen 7.1 % 7.2 % 11.2 %
Current Work 11.6% 12.1% 21.6%
Table 3: Inferred AS Compromise Comparison (Top Path)
ated, such as choosing guards with different network locations to
minimize the chance of stream failure, or perhaps allowing streams
to use potentially unsafe circuits but limiting the number of po-
tential observing ASes and IXes. Designing network-aware path-
selection algorithms for Tor remains an open challenge with un-
solved vulnerabilities such as adversarial relay placement [4] and
path fingerprinting [8, 16].
6. RELATEDWORK
The threat to the Tor network for ASes to correlate traffic was first
investigated by Feamster and Dingledine [13]. Using a simplified
AS model with shortest paths they determined roughly 10-30%
of circuits could be vulnerable to an AS adversary. Edmond and
Syverson furthered the understanding of AS adversaries against
the Tor network [11]. Using Qiu and Gao’s AS path prediction
model and an updated model for the Tor network, they determined
each circuit had an 11-18% chance that some AS adversary could
compromise the circuit. They also presented a technique to choose
paths without AS adversaries by using "Snapshots” of the AS topol-
ogy. Akhoondi et al. presented LastTor, an optimization to Tor
path selection to minimize latency by considering geographic loca-
tion [4]. They propose using the set of K top most likely AS paths
to eliminate AS adversaries. They do not report overall chances
for any given AS to compromise a circuit. Recently, Wacek et al.
studied Tor’s path selection algorithm [26]. They find that using
the iPlane’s Nano AS map, Tor paths have a 27.39% chance to be
vulnerable to an AS adversary.
The danger of IX adversaries was first demonstrated by Murdoch
and Zielinski who demonstrated that an IX could use a Bayesian
approach to sample traffic and correlate Tor flows across ASes peer-
ing at the IX [23]. Juen further investigated the threat of AS and
IX adversaries using Qiu and Gao’s AS model and the top K paths
estimating the chance of any AS being able to compromise the cir-
cuit ranging from 10% to 42% [18]. He reports the chance of an IX
compromise to be between 1 % and 20 %. Johnson et al. investi-
gate the amount of time required for an AS, IX, or IX organization
to compromise a circuit using Torps to simulate realistic Tor traf-
fic [17]. They only consider the top 3 AS and IX adversaries as
seen in their inferred data and report the overall chance of an AS
compromise to be 1.6 % for their top 3 ASes.
We now compare our results with the compromise rates of Tor
streams against previous work. We calculate the percentage of Tor
streams which contain an AS on the client to guard and exit to
destination paths in the forward, reverse and forward and reverse
directions for each of our 18 billion calculated streams. We then
compare the results of our directional AS path inferences directly to
the results from previous work and confirm that our AS path infer-
ences give similar results for the top AS path as shown in Table 3.
We find our results most closely correlate with the work of Edmond
and Syverson with Juen’s results being lower than the average and
Wacek et al. being much higher. We find this unsurprising since we
AS Our Rank Johnson et al. Rank Johnson et al. Comp % Comp % TR Comp %
AS6939 HURRICANE Electric 1 3 .6% .4% 0.0%
AS3356 Level 3 Communications 2 1 .4% .5% .13%
AS1299 TeliaNet Global 3 2 .4% .5% .5 %
IX Our Rank Johnson et al. Rank Johnson et al. Comp % Comp % TR Comp %
LINX Juniper 1 NA NA .4% .05%
DE-CIX Frankfurt 2 1 .1 % .4% .05%
Equinix Ashburn 3 NA NA .4% 0.0%
Table 4: Stream Compromise Rates for the Top 3 AS and IX Adversaries for our Work compared to Johnson et al.
also use the AS inference algorithm from Qiu and Gao. We surmise
that the AS inference from iPlanes produce higher compromise es-
timates as seen in Feamster and Dingledine and Wacek et al. Juen
also uses a modified AS mapping algorithm which may produce
lower compromise rates.
Johnson et al. investigated the time expected before a user would
most likely use a stream compromised by an AS or IX adversary.
Since we only have inferred and traceroute data for .8% of streams,
it is not possible to directly compare the time to compromise for
our clients. Instead, we investigate the ability of the top 3 AS and
IX adversaries to compromise a Tor stream. Once again, we only
consider streams which we have both inferred and traceroute data.
The ASes and IXes with the highest probability to compromise a
Tor stream are shown in Table 4. Interestingly, we observe the same
set of three top AS adversaries but in a slightly different order. We
also see the top IX adversary as number 2 for compromise rates.
We see a similar .5% rate of AS streams compromised by our top
AS adversaries. We see a higher rate of overall streams compro-
mised by our top IX adversary at .4% compared to roughly .1% in
Johnson’s work. The overall compromise rates of all streams using
the traceroute measurements is much more interesting. The tracer-
oute measurements never see AS6939, the top compromising AS
in the inferences. On the other hand, the traceroute measurements
indicate AS1299 can compromise the same percentage of streams
as indicated in the inference. We see drops for both top IX compro-
mise rates for the measurements versus the inferences. Once again,
Equinix Ashburn is not observed in the traceroute measurements.
Overall, we expect a drop in the actual ability of an IX point to
compromise a Tor stream primarily due to the extremely high false
inference of IX points. The difference between AS compromise
rates is more interesting. This shows that the path inference was al-
ways wrong in identifying AS6939 when compared to traceroutes;
however, AS 1299 was seen in the traceroutes at similar rates as
predicted. Thus, the inference accuracy appears to vary greatly de-
pending on which AS is being considered as an adversary.
7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK
This data in this study is limited in several ways. While our volun-
teer measuring relay covered roughly 25% of Tor selection proba-
bility, it still only contains 28 hosts. In addition, all path inferences
were done on paths from Tor relays, leaving us without symmet-
ric path information. Furthermore, we collected most of our data in
the span of weeks, and so missed alternative routing paths and rout-
ing instabilities. We also lack ground truth because of measurement
weaknesses such as missing or incorrect traceroute hops, missing or
stale IP prefix announcements from the public route collectors, and
incomplete or incorrect IXP prefix data. We look forward to the op-
portunity to expand network measurement in cooperation with Tor
and using third-party vantage points such as Looking Glass servers.
We also hope to make use of advances in measurement tools to ad-
vance this line of inquiry.
A larger remaining challenge is to move past the current focus
on AS-level techniques and adversaries. As Jaggard et al. de-
scribe [15], an adversary may find it easier to control a group of IP
routers running a certain version of software than to observe those
in the same AS or IXP. Evaluating the threat of more complicated
and realistic network adversaries will require both better adversary
modeling and more detailed route inference techniques.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a measurement study to evaluate the suitability
of Internet AS and IXP path-prediction algorithms to assess and
mitigate the threats from network-level adversaries to the Tor net-
work. Using traceroute data from the volunteer operators of 28 Tor
relays, we show that current techniques for inferring AS-level In-
ternet paths and the IXes between them significantly overestimate
number of ASes and IXes traversed by Tor traffic.
To evaluate what this means about the current and future security
of Tor, we perform Monte Carlo simulations of Tor’s current path-
selection algorithm and the AS/IXP-independent path-selection al-
gorithm proposed in the literature. When we examine the results,
we see evidence that Tor is likely less vulnerable to an AS or IXP
adversary than has been previously found. A direct comparison
with a prior evaluation shows that it is likely to have overstated the
risk of a single AS many times over and that of a single IXP by an
order of magnitude.
We also find that the AS/IXP-independent path-selection algorithm
may still leave a significant chance for users to be deanonymized
over time due to the errors in path prediction — we estimate a 5–
11% risk in just one week when the claimed chance is 0. Moreover,
we find that this algorithm appears to force a tradeoff between con-
nection failures and exposing users to potentially-malicious relays,
even though in nearly all cases the failures could be avoided with
better measurement.
Our results suggest the importance of accurate measurement both
for understanding Tor security and for improving it.
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